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Protection of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees* 
JOHN L. CARMICHAEL, JR. 
University of Alabama in B-irmingham 
Congress, almost from the beginning, has exercised its right to investigate .1 
It was Woodrow Wilson who described the "informing" function of Congress 
as more important than its legislative function . 2 Although nowhere does the 
Constitution grant to Congress an explicit right to investigate , the power has 
been found as an "inh erent right " in Congress to carry out its law-making 
function. 3 Th e incidence of congressional investigations has varied through-
out United States history ; three examples of heightened activity are the 
loyalty security investigations of the 1950s and more recently the Watergate 
probe into activities surrounding the 1972 presidential campaign and inquiry 
into activities of United States intelligence agencies. 
Aside from the substance of inquiry , one of the most serious and controver-
sial issues associated with congressiona l investigations has been the subjec t of 
the rights of witnesses. Congressional investigating committees are not cour ts 
of law, of course, but when they engage in the examination of witnesses the 
proceedings may have serious consequences for those questioned. This study 
will focus on proposals to protect the rights of witnesses and will examine the 
practic es of the following congressio nal committees in protecting the rights of 
witnesses: the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
(Watergate ), the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Committee on Government Operations (formerly the "McCarthy Commit-
tee" in the 1950s), the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to IntelJigence Activities , and the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence. 
Many proposals for reform have focused on the alleged need to increase the 
numb er and scope of tl1e mies shielding witnesses from mistreatment by 
investigating committees. A word of caution should be expressed, however, 
against depend ence entirely upon rules to provide tl1e safeguards. One writer 
has argued that no matter how worthy the promulgation of rules may be, their 
imposition may be like advocating that we treat the symptoms of the disease 
rather than th e disease itself. The major problem , he insists, has occurred 
* Supported by a University College Faculty Research Grant 
1 The first congressional investigation was in 1972 by the House of Repr esentatives into the 
defeat of General Arthur St. Clair's American troops by Indians in the Ohio territory . 
2 W. Wilson, Congressional Government 303 (1885). 
3 S. Friedelbaum, Contemporary Constitutional Law 332 (1972). 
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when committees have strayed from their legitimate purposes. 4 In a similar 
view, George Galloway , writing in 1951 when he was Senior Specialist in 
American government in the Libraiy of Congress , suggested that fairness for 
witnesses could not be assured by judicial decisions , statutes , or procedural 
rules . Any solution to the problem would depend on a sense of responsibility 
on the part of investigators and an aroused public opinion serving as a check on 
abuses by the committee itself. 5 It is interesting to note that his comments 
were made just prior to the well-publicized investigations of the McCarthy 
era. 
A strong argument can be made , however, that some rules , whether 
imposed by Congress , adopted voluntarily by committees , or established by 
act of Congress , are necessary to protect the rights of witnesses. There may 
well be some limit , on the other hand , to the number of rules that can be 
effective in protecting these rights. The late Senator Estes Kefauver proposed 
a relatively short list of rules which required , among other things , that timely 
written notice of meetings be given, that the subject and scope of committee 
heai·ings be made clear, and that persons injured by accusations be given the 
right of effective rebuttal. 6 Committee rules adopted subsequently to his 
recommendations have characteristically included the above mentioned pro-
tections. 
Telford Taylor , in his book The Grand Inquest , written just after the 
conclusion of the Senate McCarthy hearings, noted that witnesses at that time 
had almost no rules for their protection . A witness had "no guide otl1er than 
what he can learn regarding the committee's current attitudes and practices. "7 
Nevertheless , Taylor 's list of rules would be limited to the following , which he 
believed would be simple and easy to enforce. The witnesses should have 1) 
the right to counsel, 2) reasonable notice for his appearance before the 
committee and statement by the committee as to the subjects on which he will 
be questioned , 3) the right to make a statement , and 4) the privilege to have 
access to the record of his testimony. Taylor was skeptical of attempts at 
reform beyond the adoption of these few basic changes. 8 
Although the central focus of this article will be upon the need for effective 
procedural rules for congressional investigating committees, it should not 
overlook the contribution the courts have made in establishing restrictions on 
these committees and strengthening the protection afforded witnesses. The 
courts have intervened witl1 vruying frequency over time into the activity of 
investigating committees; at times they have appeai·ed lenient and at other 
4 Chase , "Improving Congr essional Investigations ," 30 Temp. L. Q. 126, 154 (1957). 
5 Galloway, "Congressional Inv estigations : Proposed Reforms ," 18 U.Chi .L.R ev. 478, 494-95 
(1951). 
6 Kefauver , "Cod e of Conduct for Congressional Investigations ," 8 Ark.L.R ev. 369, 374-75 
(1954). 
7 T. Taylor , Grand Inqu est 242 (1955). 
8 Id . at 254. 
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times strict. Nevertheless , some basic rules and limitations have emerged. 
The Federal Courts and Congressional Investigations 
Very early, the United States Supreme Court , in an effort to protect 
, itnesses and to prevent inquiries which seek to conduct "fishing" expedi-
tions has required that authorizing resolutions of congressional committees 
indicate a legislative purpose and that there be an explicit delegation of 
authority from the house to the committees to investigate specific subject 
matter. In Kilbourn v. Thompson 9 the Supreme Court overturned a convic-
tion for contempt of a witness who refused to answer questions before an 
investigating committee of the House of Representatives. The Court held that 
the House had exceeded its powers by empowering one of its committees to 
make the investigation. Part of the Court's objection was on the grounds of a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine; the proceedings were being 
handled by the federal courts and the committee was usurpingjudicial power. 
In addition, the Court ruled that Congress could not inquire into the com-
pletely personal affairs of individuals. Investigations must relate to some valid 
legislative purpose. 
However , the Court retreated somewhat when in In re Chapman 10 it 
established a presumption in favor of a valid legislative purpose on the part of 
Congress. The Court ruled that it was not necessary for the Senate to say in 
advance what legislation it proposed to enact. 
In Sinclair v. United States, 11 a case growing out of the Teapot Dome 
inquiry , the Court upheld the right of the Senate to hold the witness in 
contempt for refusal to disclose certain information because allegedly it re-
lated to his private affairs and, in any event, pertained to matters before the 
courts. The committee was justified in compelling this testimony in exercise of 
its legislative powers and it had the right to conduct the investigation even 
though information sought might be used by the courts. 
In the period between this case and Watkins v. United States, 12 there was 
little interference by the Supreme Court in the activities of investigating 
committees. 13 This was particularly true with respect to investigations by the 
9 103 U.S. 168 (1881). 
JO 166 U.S. 661 (1897). 
11 279 U.S. 263 (1929). 
12 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
13 Ther e were a few notable exceptions. Among them was United States v. Rumely , 345 U.S. 
41 (1953). One question was whether the information sought went beyond the scope of the 
authorizing resolution creating the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, empower-
ing it to investigate , among other matters , "all lobbying activities , intended to influence, 
encourage, promote , or retard legislation." At issue was the refusal by Rumely to disclose the 
names of certain persons purchasing books of a political nature published by an organization 
whose secretary was Rumely. The Court avoided constitutional questions but reversed the 
conviction for contempt on the ground that the information sought was outside the scope of the 
authorizing resolution . 
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House Un-American Activities Committee in the 1940s and the 1950s and by 
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on 
Government Operations , then termed the McCarthy Committee . A change 
occurred in 1957. 
John T. Watkins, a labor union organizer, appeared as a witness before a 
subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. He was 
willing to answer questions about his relationship with the Communist Party 
as well as questions about persons currently members of the Communist Party 
but refused to answer questions about those persons he believed had left the 
Party on the grounds that thes e questions were not germane to the work of the 
committee. He was convicted of contempt of Congress under a statute which 
made it a criminal offense to refuse to answer "any question pertinent to the 
question under inquiry. "14 The Supreme Court sustained his refusal to an-
swer the questions on the ground that they were not pertinent to the inquiry. 
The Court overturned his conviction as a violation of Due Process under the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. There was no opportunity for the 
witness to judge whether he could afford not to answer because of the failure of 
the authorizing resolution and remarks by the committee chairman and other 
members of the committee to provide any satisfactory guide . 
Although the Court did not base its holding on First Amendment grounds, 
it did , by way of dicta , indicate that First Amendment rights might be invoked 
and suggested that the Bill of Rights applies to congressional investigations. 
The Court stated that "there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of 
exposure. "15 
The Court has also protected witnesses by insisting that committees adhere 
to the rules which they have adopted. A case in point is Yellin v. United 
States. 16 The House Un-American Activities Committee was investigating 
alleged Communist infiltration in the steel industry. Having information that 
Yellin was a Communist , the committee decided to call him and question him 
in public, rather than in executive session. (Yellin's attorney insisted that 
questioning be in executive session. ) The staff director , contrary to his power 
under the rules of the committee , denied, on his own authority , Yellin's 
request . The Court decided that the witness was entitled to have the comm it-
tee follow its own rules of procedure , and since the committee had failed to do 
so it reversed his conviction. 
Recently , the Court has appeared more reluctant to intervene in suppor t of 
the witness. In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund 17 the Court 
sustained a committee's subpoena powers under the Speech or Debate Clause 
of the Constitution in tl1e face of an alleged violation of the witness' First 
Amendment rights. 
14 2 U.S. C. #192 (1938). 
15 Watkins v. United States , 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957). 
16 374 U.S. 109 (1963). 
17 421 U.S. 491 (1975). 
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Analysis of Committee Rules and Practices Before Certain Committees 
Although intervention by the courts has been important , the rules estab-
lished by Congress for its investigating committee and the rules adopted by 
the individual committees have been a crucial element in protecting rights of 
witnesses. Rule XI 2(a) of the House of Representatives required that each 
standing committee of the House adopt written rules which shall be published 
in the Congressional Record. 18 Committee hearings must be open to the 
public unless there is a vote within the committee, in open session with a 
quorum present , to close them. 19 Each committee (except the Rules Commit-
tee) must make public announcement of the date, place , and subject matter of 
the committee's investigation one week prior to the commencement of the 
hearing unless the committee deems it necessary to start earlier. 20 So far as 
practicable each committee must require each witness to file with the commit-
tee, prior to the witness' appearance, a written copy of what he proposes to 
say.21 Committees are required , for the purpose of taking testimony , to 
establish a quorum not to be less than two members. 22 
The Chairman must state , at the beginning of the hearing , the topic of the 
inquiry and a copy of the committee rules must be made available to the 
witness. The witness has the right to counsel. If the committee believes that 
evidence to be received tends to "defame, degrade, or incriminate" a person it 
shall take testimony in closed session, permit that person to appear , and 
receive requests to subpoena additional witnesses. The committee shall make 
a ailable to the witness a transcript of his testimony at public session , and in 
private session when authorized by the committee. 23 
The House Select Committee on Intelligence in its rules, adopted May, 
1975, accepted the House Rules except as otherwise provided in its own 
rules. 24 The Select Committee conformed to the minimal requirement for a 
quorum when it provided that a quorum for taking testimony and receiving 
evidence shall consist of two mem hers. 25 Provisions with respect to closed and 
open committee meetings agreed essentially with the provisions in House 
Rule XI. The Select Committee's rules specifically prohibited direct and 
cross-examination by witness' counsel although no specific prohibition is 
contained in House Rule XI. 26 All members of the Select Committee had five 
minutes each to interrogate witnesses until all had done so, and thereafter , 
additional time at the discretion of the Chairman. 27 Thus, all members of the 
18 See Rules of the House of Repr esentatives, 94th Cong ., 1st Sess. (Revised June 16, 1975). 
18 Rule Xl 2 (g) (2). 
20 Rule Xl 2 (g) (3). 
21 Rule XI 2 (g) (-l). 
22 Rule XI 2 (h). 
23 Rule XI 2 (k). 
24 Rule 1, Hous e Select Committe e on Intelligence (Adopted May 21, 1975). 
25 Rule 2(5). 
26 Rule 4(1). 
27 Rule 4(8). 
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committee , majority as well as minority, had the opportunity to question, 
allowing presumably varying viewponts to be presented in the questioning 
and perhaps assuring that witnesses will have "friendly " as well as "adverse" 
questioning. Supplemental views of individual committee members , in addi -
tion to the final report of the committee , could be filed. 28 
Representative Otis G. Pike , Chairman of the House Select Committee, 
described the rights of witnesses as being well protected during the hear-
ings . 29 Staff members could take testimony in executive session but this 
testimony could not be placed in the committee's record unless the full 
committee voted to have it included therein. Witnesses were allowed to ask 
questions themselves although this practice was not provided for in the 
committee rules. There was no swearing of witnesses although any deposi-
tions were taken under oath. An attempt was made to keep the hearings public 
as much as possible. Media coverage of committee hearings in public session 
was permitted ; however , if a witness objected to the presence of television 
cameras , his interrogation was held in executive session at his request. No 
witness was prosecuted for contempt since no citation for contempt was 
approved by the full House. 30 The example of this committee demonstrates 
that a great deal depends upon the attitudes of the committee chairman and a 
desire to treat witnesses fairly . 
Senate standing , select , or special committees are governed by certain 
rules, most of them contained in Title 2 of the United States Code , Sections 
190-194. The committees must publicly state the date , location , and subject 
matter of any hearing one week in advance unless the committee decides 
there is reason to begin the hearing earlier. 31 Meetings of all committees, 
except Appropriations , must be open to the public unless the testimony 
involves national security matters , adversely affect the character or reputation 
of an individual or may disclose confidential information protected by law. 32 A 
wih1ess is required to file in writing a statement of proposed testimony at least 
one day prior to his testimony unless waived by the committee . 33 No witness 
can refuse to testify on the grounds that he will be disgraced before the 
committe e. 34 A refusal to testify or answer a question pertinent to the hearing 
will make the witness guilty of a misdemeanor . 35 Finally , each committee 
28 Rule 8(1). 
29 Int erview with Repr esentativ e Otis G. Pike ( Y) in Washington , D.C. , March 25, 1976. 
30 nder an act of Congr ess, originall y passed in 1857, 18 U.S .C. #401 (1958), the committee 
must recommend to the par ent body which must vote the cont empt citation. It is then sent to the 
Unit ed States distri ct attorn ey who pr esents the matt er to a federal grand jury. If an indictment is 
forthcoming it is tried in a federal district court and then may be appealed up to the Supreme 
Court . See C. Pritch ett , The Am erican Constituti .011 217 (2d ed., 1968). 
31 2 U.S .C. 190a-l (a) (1970). 
32 2 U.S .C. 190a-l(b ) (1970). 
33 2 U.S.C. 190a-l (c) (1970). 
34 2 U.S.C. 193 (1938). 
35 2 U.S .C. 192 (1938). 
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must adopt rules consistent with th e Standin g Rules of th e Senat e and publish 
them in the Congressional Record . 36 
A standin g committ ee of th e Senat e, with perhap s th e broad est mandat e for 
investigation, is the Senate Pern,an ent Subcommitt ee on Inves tigations of the 
Committ ee on Governm ent Operation s. Among other matt ers, th e sub com-
mitt ee is empow ered to investigat e th e "efficiency and economy of operations 
of all bran ches of the Governm ent ,"37 criminal or improp er activiti es in the 
field of labor -manage ment relation s, 38 the energy probl em, 39 and int er-
governm ental relations betwee n th e Unit ed Stat es, stat e, and local govern-
ments. 40 
The rul es of the Senat e Perman ent Sub committ ee on In vestigations are 
fairly detailed and specific. Subpo enas for th e att endanc e of witn esses and th e 
production of mat erial may be issued by th e subcommitt ee chairman or any 
member of th e committ ee designat ed by him .41 For administ erin g oaths to 
witnesses and th e taking of testimony , one memb er of th e subcommitt ee, with 
permission of the chairman and the rankin g minority member, can constitut e 
a quorum . 42 Thi s contrasts with Rule XI (2) 01) of th e House of Repr esentativ es 
which requir es a minimum of tv,o members for receiving evidence and taking 
testimony. 43 
One possible criti cism of the rules of this subcommitt ee is the fact that the 
chairman of th e sub committ ee can issue subpo enas without polling th e entir e 
committ ee. Minority couns el for the committ ee has bee n parti cularl y desirou s 
of having an agree ment that the minority be consult ed before issuance. 
Senator Charles H . Percy (Ill. ), rankin g minority memb er , secur ed a com-
mitment by letter from Senator Henry M . Jackson (Wash .) of the majority , 
that the rankin g minorit y member would be consult ed before issuance of 
subpoenas. 44 Thi s requir ement of greater consensus by committ ee memb ers 
seems to be a reasonable pr erequisit e which should militat e against a large 
numb er of subp oenas dir ected at witn esses. 
The Senate Select Committ ee on Presidenti al Campai gn Activities (Wat er-
gate) wa established und er Senate Resolution 60. 45 Among oth er thin gs, the 
re elution permitt ed th e committ ee to issue subpo enas throu gh its chairman 
or anyone designated by him . 46 For th e purpos es of taking testimony, the 
36 2 U.S.C. 190a-2 (1970). 
37 See S. Res. 49, 94th Cong., 1st Sess . (1975). Sec. 4(a) (1). 
38 Sec. 4(a) (2). 
39 Sec . 4(a) (7). 
40 Sec. 5. 
41 Rules of Procedur e for the Senate Permanent Subcommitt ee on Investigations of the 
Committee on Governm ent Op erations (Adopt ed March 3, 1976), Rule 2. 
42 Rule 5. 
43 See Rules of the House of Represe ntatives , 94th Cong. , 1st Sess . (Revised June 16, 1975). 
44 Interview with Mr. Robe rt Sloan, Counsel, Perm anent Subcommitt ee on Investigations, in 
Washington, D .C ., March 23, 1976. 
45 93rd Cong ., 1st Sess . (1973). 
46 Sec. 3(b). 
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committee might set a quorum of less than a majority of the members and the 
committee could hold hearings at any time or place determined by it. 47 The 
resolution permitted the committee to adopt its own rules of procedure. 48 
The rules adopted by the committee were the most detailed of any of the 
congressional investigation committees to date. These rules provided that 
subpoenas of witnesses would occur at a "reasonably sufficient time " prior to 
the hearing. 49 All witnesses must be furnished a copy of the commi ttee 
rules. 50 Questioning of witnes ·es was limited to committee members or 
authorized staff members. 51 In addition a witness had the right to counse l wbo 
could request the testimony of other witnesses or the introduction of other 
evidence. 52 Although there was no right of direct or cross-examination by 
witness' counsel, counsel might prepare in writing questions to be asked of a 
witness. 53 Also, any person subject to investigation in public hearing might 
submit in writing to the committee chairman questions for cross-exam ina-
tion . 54 
Any person who believed that testimony would adversely affect his reputa-
tion could request to appear personally before the committee or file a sworn 
statement relevant to the adverse testimony. 55 o testimony in executive 
session was to be made available to any other person except commi ttee 
members and staff. 56 Any evid nee in executive session which the commi ttee 
decided might "defame , degrad , or incriminate a person " would not be 
introduced in public hearing unless that person was given an opportunity to 
rebut it. 57 A witness had the right to see any h·anscript of his testimony prior to 
it release .58 Finally , any wih1ess might request , on the grounds of harass-
mentor physical discomfort , that no camera be directed at him during public 
session. 59 
Perhaps the most important failure to protect witnesses during the Water-
gate hearing was the problem of leaks. Several persons who were involved in 
47 Secs. l (d) and 3(a) (2). Rule XXV 5(b) of the Standing Rules of the Senate provides that each 
standing commi tt ee or subcommittee thereof can set a number less than one third of its member-
ship for taking sworn testimony. 
48 Sec. l (c). 
49 Rules of Procedure for the enate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
(Adopted April 1973), Rule 11. 
50 Rule 13. 
51 Rule 15. 
52 Rules 19 and 22. 
53 Rule 24. 
54 Rule 25. 
55 Rule 26. 
56 Rule 27. 
57 Rul e 28. 
58 Rule 30. 
59 Rule 35. 
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the investigation confirm ed this. 60 Th ere appeared to be a selective leaking of 
information which became widespread. 61 Allege dly , many of the records 
subpoenaed by the committ ee went beyond the mandat e of the committ ee. 
There was a tend ency to become blind ed to th e rights of witnesses. 62 A 
witness did not have the right to review the final report of the committee 
before release. 63 How eve r , on th e positiv e side there were practices which 
prot ecte d witnesses by going beyond th e technical requir ement s of the com-
mitt ee rules. Th ere was no effort by the committee to have a witness who , 
pr ev iousl y having claimed th e Fifth Am endm ent right against se lf-
incrimin ation in executiv e sessions , to claim it again in public session. 64 This 
contrasted sharply with th e practic e of th e McCarthy committee in th e 1950s. 
Also the Watergate committ ee mad e testimony in executiv e session available 
at the committee 's expens e even though not provid ed in th e rules. 65 Th e rul es 
of the Watergate committee have been describ ed as affording witn esses 
greater protection than the rules of other committees. 66 
A recently concluded investigation was that of th e Senat e Select Committee 
to Study Governmental Opera tions with Respect to Int elligence Activities. 
The rules of this committee 67 rese mbl e the rules of th e other committ ees 
pr eviously discus sed. 
A spec ial problem posed by this committee's investigation was that of the 
identification of int elligenc e agency employ ees and their missions and the 
possible danger posed to them . In one instanc e a name that would have bee n 
included in the "Assassination Report " was removed from the docum ent after 
a court suit was filed , but a Washington newspap er secured the nam e and 
reported it anyv.,ay. Another probl em during th e investigation was the ques-
tion of deciding when it was incumb ent on th e committee to warn a witn ess 
with respec t to claiming th e Fifth Amendm ent prot ection against incrimina-
tion. 68 
80 Interv iew with Mr. Eiler C. Ravnh olt, Administrative Assistant to U.S. Senator Danie l K. 
Inouye in Washington , D . C. , March 24, 1976 ; interview with Mr. Terry Lenzne r , form erly 
Assistant Chief Counse l, Senat e Select Committee on Presidential Cam paign Activities , in 
Washington , D.C. , March 31, 1976. 
6 1 See F. Thomp on , At That Point in Time 55 (1975). 
82 Int erview with Mr. Michael Madiga n, forme rly Assistant Minority Cou nsel, Senate Select 
Commi ttee on Pr esidential Campa ign Activities , in Washington , D.C. , 1arch 30 , 1976. 
63 Int erview with Mr . Terry Lenz ner , March 31, 1976. 
64 Interview with Mr. Eiler C. Ravnholt , March 24, 1976. 
65 Int erview with Mr . Terr y Lenzner, March 3 1, 1976. 
86 Int erview with Arthur S. Mill e r , Pr ofesso r of Law , ational Law Ce nt er , George 
Washington Unive rsity; formerly Chief Co nsultant , Senate Select Committee on Pr es idential 
Campaign Activities , in Washington , D .C. March 23, 1976. 
87 Rules of Procedure for the Senate Select Comm ittee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Int ellige nce Activities (As amended , September 22 , 1975). 
88 Interview with Mr . Michae l Madigan, Cou nsel, Senate Se! ct Committ ee to Study Gov-
ernmental Operations with Respect to Int elligence Activities , in Washington , D.C., March 30 , 
1976. 
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Minimal Standards for Committ ees of Congress 
Since th e rul es of proc edur e applicab le to committees of Congr ess are not to 
be found in a single source but are contain ed in certain judicial decisions , in 
standing rul es of Congress, in rul es adopted by individual committees, and in 
federal statutes, a strong argum ent can be mad e that certain minimal rules 
should be establish ed by law applicable to all congressional inves tigations. 
Th e Hous e, und er Rul e XI, has provid ed a set of rul es applicable to House 
Committees and the Senat e has certain rules set forth in its Standing Rules 
and in Titl e 2 of the United Stat es Code. Th ere should be a law which would 
es tablish minimal rules applicable to both Senat e and Hous e. Thi~ law shou ld 
includ e the following guarantees: 1) each committee must make public an-
nounc ement of the elate, plac e, and subject matter of the inves tigation at leas t 
one week prior to the commencement of the hear ing; 2) each witness shal l be 
served a copy of the resolution or statute es tablishing the committee and be 
provid ed a set of the committee rul es prior to the hearing ;69 3) he shall have 
the right to make a statement at th e beginning and conclusion of his tes timony; 
4) he shall have the right to counse l and the committee shall make an effort to 
furnish him counse l if he is unabl e to do so; 5) witness' counsel shal l have the 
opportunity to submit in writing qu es tions to be asked of other witnesses ; 6) 
subpoenas for the app earanc e of witn esses can be mad e only by majority vote 
of the entir e committee; 7) a person not initially pr ese nt at the hearing must 
have the opportunity to appear or file a written sworn statement in rebuttal to 
any adverse statement mad e about him ; 8) secrecy of tes timony in exec utive 
session must be pr ese rved ; 9) individual committee members can review the 
final report and issu e their own report if they disagr ee with it; 70 10) comm it-
tees must adopt rul es and publish them in th e Congressional Record within 
thirty days after th eir adoption. 
Many of these rul es, applicab le to th eir respective committees, have been 
adopted by th e Hous e and Senat e, have bee n adopted by congression al 
committees themselves , or hav e bee n embodi ed in applicabl e law. In order to 
promot e consist ency and assure minimal guarantees for all witn esses, how-
69 See Cou ncil of State Governments , Legis lati ve fll vestigations: A Surve y and Recom menda-
tions (1968). This stud y proposes a Model Code of Fair Procedures which includes the following 
rules: 1) Adequate notice shall be g.iven witnesses ; 2) service of subpoenas must be at least one 
week in advance of the hearing ; 3) the person subpoenaed shall be served a copy of' the resolution 
or sta tut e establishing the commit tee , be provided a sta teme nt informing him of the subject 
matter of the investigation , and be furnished a copy of' th rules under which the com mittee 
opera tes ; 4) he may have counsel of his own choosing who , in additi on to advising the witness of his 
rights, may submi t to the committ ee proposed questions to be asked relevan t to matters on which 
th e witness may be ques tioned . In addition the witness may propou nd questions on his own. At 
23-24. 1 lowever, this last named right might pro ve chaotic in the hearin g and the author of this 
articl e doubts that the right should be includ ed. Ce rtrunly, if the commi ttee is willing to secu re 
counse l for a witness unable to secure one for himself, his rights will be adequa tely protected. 
70 Mr. Rober t Sloan, Counse l, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Inves tigations , argued 
strongly for greater inpu t by the minority into the final repo rt or as an alternative, the right to file a 
separate report. Int erv iew, March 23, 1976. 
PROTECTION OF WIT ESSES 75 
e\'er , a strong argument can be made for Congress to pass a law, applicable to 
all congressional committ ees, incorporating these basic rul es. 
Additionally , it is recommend ed that th e "Office of Legislative H earing 
Examiner" be created. 71 This would assur e a more expert approach to th e 
questioning of witnesses. It would relieve Congr essmen of the heavy respon-
sibility they now have for conducting th e hearings in a fair and expeditious 
mann er. The "Legislative H earing Examin er" would have a thorough knowl-
edge of the rules applicable to the hearing and by training he would be bett er 
equ ipped to perform his duti es than individual Congressmen. H e would be a 
lawyer . The office would be analogous to that of the Administrativ e Law Judg e 
in the administrativ e agencies who hears testimony and makes decisions. ot 
only would the crea tion of this office assure more equitable trea tment of 
witnesses, but it would also enable Congress to carry out its investigativ e 
function more efficiently. The "Legislative Hearing Examiner " should also 
posses a well train ed staff to assist him in performing his duti es. 
Another impro vement would be th e crea tion of a body in Congress to hear 
comp laints of the violation of committee rules. Since th e courts are reluctant 
to interve ne in commitee pro cee dings , this would go a long way toward 
affording protection to witnesses whose rights might have been abused. In 
addition, Congress should consider passing a law that would permit a witness 
who had been falsely accused in a proc eeding to institut e a civil suit in federal 
court to secure damages against th e witness who falsely testifies. This would 
provide a stron g incentive for witnesses to be truthful in the testimony they 
give. 
Although the rules establish ed for the prot ection of a witness and the 
adh erence to them by the committe e are important safeguards for the rights of 
a witness, it is still incumb ent on counsel for th e witness to make good use of 
the rules. In addition , the committ ee chairman and committee members have 
a responsibility to assure that staff members , in the excitement of the inves ti-
gation, are not blinded to the rights of witnesses. 72 In th e final analysis a great 
deal depend s on th e sense of fairness of all concern ed , parti cularly the 
committ ee chairman, but also committ ee members , the staffs of committees 
and the news media. 
71 See Miller, "Imp lications of Watergate: Some Prop osals for Cu ttin g the Presidency Down 
to Size," 2 f-last .L.Rev . 33 (1975). Professor Arthur S. Miller directs his at ten tion specifical ly to 
the problem of Congress in checking the execu tive branch of governme nt bu t his comments are 
equally app licable to other investiga tory functions of Congress. He proposes the esta blishmen t of 
the o!Hce of "legislative hearing exam iner" because , as he argues, no "sing le member of Co ngress 
is expected to be knowledgeable on matters covering the entire execu tive branch (as well as 
outside it) ... . " At 62. 
72 Mr. Michael Madigan stressed that attorneys for witnesses must be alert to their clients ' 
rights and believed that in the Watergate inves tigatio n there was a tendency of junior staff 
members in the excitement of the investigation, to encroac h on the rights of witnesses. Int erview , 
~1arch 30, 1976. 
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Conclusion 
This article has reviewed proposals for improving the rights of witnesses 
before committees of Congress ; it has studied the role of the Supreme Court in 
protecting these rights. In addition , it has examined the rules of four commi t-
tees of Congress relating to rights of witnesses and has proposed a set of rules 
to be embodied in federal law, applicable to all committees of Congress. 73 
These rules embody guarantees that will alleviate the need for intervention by 
the courts. In the first place , the courts are reluctant to intervene ; second ly, 
court proceedings are time-consuming and costly. Relieving the cour ts of the 
burden of protecting witnesses will also enable the committees to pe1form 
their tasks more efficiently and will bolster protection afforded witnesses. 
Should Congress enact the list of rules proposed in this article , they could 
be modified in light of the experience of future committees as they conduc t 
investigations. Congress and its committees in carrying out the investigative 
function have come a long way in protecting witnesses ' rights; uniform rules 
will further aid the process. 
73 These rules are intended to be miJ1imal ones and should not detrac t from flexibility on the 
part of committ ees of Congress which might want to adopt additional rules to fit the particular 
circumstances of the investigation. 
